Model and plugin supply chain

Check method

Lists declared third-party models, plugins and MCP servers used by the project.

Possible evidence type

Code or configuration review, without exploiting the risk.

Access and limitations

Connected repository. Actual results and checks not run appear in your report. A check with no finding does not guarantee the absence of risk.

Concrete scenario

A model, plugin or package is loaded from a mutable third-party source.

What to inspect

Record source, version and integrity controls; a trusted provider name alone does not establish artifact integrity.

Remediation approach

Pin approved artifacts where possible and review changes before promoting them to production.

Separate instructions from untrusted content

An LLM may process user text, retrieved documents, tool output and application instructions in the same context. Content that looks like an instruction can therefore influence an answer. A suspicious answer is not automatically a data leak or an action: record exactly what changed and whether sensitive data or tools were involved.

1. List input sources: user messages, documents, retrieval, history and tool results.
2. Identify which instructions and secrets are placed in the model context.
3. Distinguish a changed answer from a demonstrated confidential disclosure or unauthorized tool call.

Build layered protections

A stronger prompt is not a complete security boundary. Enforce tool permissions and data access outside the model, minimize what it can see, and validate its output before using it as executable code, HTML or a trusted decision.

1. Remove credentials and unnecessary confidential material from context.
2. Apply identity-scoped retrieval and allowlisted tool operations.
3. Require approval for consequential actions and retain regression tests for known bypasses.

References

OWASP LLM03 · OWASP ASI04